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STOCK REPURCHASE ABUSES AND THE
NO PREJUDICE RULE*
CoRPoRATE reacquisition of shares may seriously threaten the interests
of creditors and remaining stockholders.' Because of this danger, many
states have a general rule permitting repurchase only if these interests are
not prejudiced.2 Strict application of this "no prejudice" rule has ade-
quately safeguarded creditors.3 But the remaining stockholders receive
scant protection, since courts usually will invoke the rule on their behalf
only when stock repurchase flagrantly violates their interests, 4 or pre-
sents some danger to the general public.5
A shareholder seeking the repurchase of his stock usually falls into one of
two broad classes-classes widely differing in the merits of the claim they
present. He may be an outsider who w~as originally induced to invest on
right, like the right to work, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), or the right to own
and enjoy property, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), or, as in the Valle case, the
right to make and enforce a contract.
* Winchell v. Plywood Corporation, 85 N.E2d 313 (Afass. 1949).
1. This Note is concerned only with some of the perennial abuses of stock repurchases.
Reacquisition of stock by a corporation may, of course, be occasioned by legitimate and de-
sirable goals. Illustrative of these are: reduction of stock issued in excess of charter, enforce-
ment of a lien or foreclosure of chattel mortgage secured by the corporation's stock, and
implementation of employee stock purchase plans. For an excellent general discussion of
these and other legitimate uses of the repurchase power see Nemmers, The Po'wr of a
Corporation to Purchase its Own Stock, [1942] Ws. L. Rxv. 161, 163.
Depending upon the specific factual situation involved, other functions of stock repur-
chase may be either desirable or undesirable. Adams v. Protective Union Co., 210 Mass.
172, 96 N.E. 74 (1911) (attempts to buy out dissenting shareholders) ; Interstate Distribut-
ing Co. v. Connell, 46 Pa. Super. 551 (1911) (acceptance of stock in cancellation of debt).
2. The "no prejudice" rule and the other rules applicable to stock repurchase are set
out, by jurisdictions, in the appendix at the end of this Note.
3. See, e.g., In re Feckheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (2d Cir. 1914) ; In re Vulcan
Soot Cleaner Co., 11 F. Supp. 388 (W.D. Pa. 1935).
4. See Interstate Distributing Co. v. Connell, 46 Pa. Super. 551 (1911) (repurchase
contract after start of liquidation to give stockholder par value for his stock held unenforce-
able though agreed to by liquidating trustee) ; Augsburg Land & Improvement Co. v. Pepper,
95 Va. 92,27 S.E. 807 (1897) (repurchase contract made after stockholder attended meeting
where it was agreed to liquidate held unenforceable).
5. Thus, where more than one-third of the outstanding stock of a large power company
had been sold with the representations that it would be repurchased at par on demand, the
position of other stockholders seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the repurchase contracts
as prejudicial was manifestly strengthened by threats of disruption of vital public services
and losses to creditors. Hoops v. Leddy, 119 NJ. Eq. 296, 182 Atl. 271 (Ch. 1936). Com-
parison of this case with a previous one, dealing with the same corporation and repurchase
contracts, indicates the persuasive weight of the public interest factor. In the earlier case,
Downs v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 115 N.J. Eq. 348, 170 Ad. 835 (Ch. 1934), aff'd.,
117 N.j. Eq. 138, 174 At. 887 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934), the large amount of stock affected
was not known, and the New Jersey court had no difficulty in arriving at a contrary result.
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the strength of a repurchase contract; or he may be an insider trading on an
influential position. Sales inducement contracts made with an outsider may
benefit the original stockholders because this is often the only way the
corporation can attract needed capital. Having bargained for and received
money plasma in time of corporate stress, the original stockholders should
not later be allowed to reject the contract terms. Repurchases from an
insider, on the other hand, whether resulting from prior executory contract
or spontaneous transaction, frequently give undue advantage to a dominant
stockholder or director at the expense of the best interests of the corpo-
ration. Consequently, when later attacked by the other shareholders, in-
sider transactions of this kind seldom merit the same favorable judicial
recognition as outsider transactions.
Courts have recognized this fundamental difference. Ignoring the no
prejudice rule in cases arising from executory repurchase contracts made
with outsiders,' the courts in effect have utilized the rule only in transactions
involving influential shareholders. Even in insider cases, however, the rule
is grudgingly applied.
Winchell v. Plywood Corporation 7 typifies the minimal safeguard the rule
affords other stockholders. Plaintiff Winchell was a stockholder, director
and treasurer of the corporation when in 1938 the corporation, represented
solely by its President," contracted to repurchase his stock at his option.
Few stockholders 9 were aware of this agreement until 1945 when, just one
hour before he voted for liquidation, Winchell demanded performanceY'
If enforced, the contract would have given Winchell approximately 820,000
more than he would have received as a liquidating stockholder." The court
held the agreement not prejudicial on the ground that "fairness of the
contract with respect to the rights of other stockholders must be tested by
the circumstances existing at the time it was made." 12
The fairness test applied by the court rests on the familiar freedom of
contract notion that a contracting party always knows his own best inter-
est.13 But whatever the validity of this reasoning in ordinary commercial
6. See, e.g., Griffin v. Bankers' Realty Investment Co., 105 Neb. 419, 181 N.W. 169
(1920) ; Grace Securities Corp. v. Roberts, 158 Va. 792, 164 S.E. 700 (1932).
7. 85 N.E.2d 313 (Mass. 1949).
8. Id. at 315. Apparently the agreement was subsequently approved by the corpora-
tion's three directors, only one of whom, Winchell, was still a stockholder or director at the
time repurchase was demanded. Id. at 316. Approval by the directors apparently consisted
of mere year-end ratification of all action taken by the officers during the year.
9. At the time Winchell sought repurchase of his shares there were five stockholders
in the corporation, including Winchell. Three of these shareholders testified without con-
tradiction that they were unaware of the repurchase contract until Winchell demanded its
performance or May 24, 1945. Record, pp. 77, 80, 107.
10. Record, pp. 81, 124. Winchell, of course, was aware of the plan to sell the assets
prior to the liquidation meeting. 85 N.E2d 313, 315.
11. This was Winchell's own estimate. Record, p. 26.
12. 85 N.E.2d 313, 318.
13. Ibid.
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transactions, it has little applicability to the Winchell case, where the stock-
holder-complainants had no knowledge of the contract at the time it was
made. The no prejudice rule was devised to protect stockholders-vwho in
repurchase cases are the real parties in interest-and it perverts the rule
to assume that notice to the corporation is notice to them.
The excessive price which Winchell received for his stock is but one of the
many abuses to which insider repurchases are subject. Influential stock-
holders may also be permitted to withdraw painlessly from shaky corpora-
tions 14 or to receive valuable assets for stock of doubtful worth.10 Re-
purchases can also be used to manipulate control of the corporation, for as
long as the repurchased stock remains unsold, the voting power of outstand-
ing stock will be proportionately increased."0 Finally, repurchase may be
used to avoid payment of legitimate dividends. 1 7
In all of these instances, the rights of the many stockholders are prejudiced
to benefit the few. Courts, however, usually do not so find.'8 On the theory
that the stock taken back is commensurate in value to the repurchase price,
they frequently declare that such repurchases do not reduce capital,"
14. Thus in Barrett v. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 302, 175 N.E. 765 (1931), the
corporation's general manager who had purchased common stock for $35,887.50 was per-
mitted to have his shares repurchased by the corporation at a time when its assets were less
than its liabilities, and when it was unable to pay its current liabilities as they became due.
Moreover, he was given an excessive price for this stock-six notes in the total amount of
$43,02328. Cf. Mlurphy v. Hanlon, 322 Mass. 683, 79 N.E.2d 292 (1948).
15. See, e.g., Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co., 114 Mass. 37 (1873) (stockholders
purchasing corporate land permitted to pay one half the sale price in over-valued corporate
stock). An unsuccessful attempt to barter dubious stock for corporate land is presented
in Augsburg Land & Improvement Co. v. Pepper, 95 Va. 92,27 S.E. 807 (1897).
16. E.g, Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140 Wis. 476, 123 N.av. 102 (1909). In the Gilchrist
case, more than one half of a corporation's stock was held in a partnership agreement by two
stockholders. One shareholder-partner desired to sell out. The other purchased part of
his shares with money borrowed from the corporation and caused the remainder of the shares
to be repurchased by the corporation, thereby retaining effective control. Cf. Spiegel v.
Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mlass. 393, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1937), where control was retained
within an interlocking directorate group by use of the repurchase power.
17. In Gilchrist v. Highfield, supra note 16, only two dividends had been paid in the 10
years prior to repurchase of the stock-for which accumulated surplus w.as expended over
the vain protests of the minority stockholders.
18. Thus in Massachusetts, where such suits appear to be most common, and where the
requirement that repurchase be without prejudice to other stockholders is continually reit-
erated with approval, there seems to be no reported case in which a repurchase has been
invalidated as prejudicial to the other stockholders. See, however, note 4 supra.
In contrast the courts usually will not tolerate inequitable attempts by controlling stock-
holders to enforce corporate option repurchase agreements against a single shareholder, thus
forcing return of his shares to the corporation. E.g., Albert E. Touchet, Inc. v. Touchet,
264 Mass. 499, 163 N.E. 184 (1928) ; Adams v. Protective Union Co., 210 Mass. 172, 96
N.F. 74 (1911).
19. E.g., Barrett v. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 302, 175 N.E. 765 (1931).
The theory that repurchased shares are a corporate asset has been thuroulily de-
molished by the commentators. See, e.g., BALLANN, Conrora77oxs §§ 256a, 2 0 (rev.
ed. 1946).
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even though in fact the stock may not be marketable at all because of gen-
erally declining business conditions or the pinched straits of the particular
corporation.20 And often the courts offer the rationale that the repurchases
fall'within the area of permissible business discretion.2
Shareholders could be adequately protected against these insider trading
abuses if the courts would rigorously apply the no prejudice rule to trans-
actions of this kind, and recognize injury to stockholders who in fact have
been harmed. 21 In no case involving an insider transaction should the find-
ing on the question of prejudice be altered by the existence or non-existence
of a prior executory contract. And in all insider cases in which a prior exec-
utory contract has been made without the knowledge of the remaining share-
holders, fairness of the transaction should be tested as of the time perform-
ance is demanded.23 Otherwise, repurchase contracts with buyer's option
allow the insider to choose the time of repurchase most favorable to him-
self-a time which will be correspondingly prejudicial to the other stock-
holders.
Repurchases based on sales inducement contracts present a different case.
Innocent and commercially unknowing buyers are frequently led to make
purchases on the strength of corporate contracts to repurchase at the buyer's
option. 24 Efforts to enforce these contracts, even when they result from the
20. The notion that repurchase does not reduce the corporate assets is actually an un-
convincing myth with which the courts are wont to salve their consciences. See Nemmers,
The Power of a Corporation to Purchase its Own Stock, [1942] Wis. L. Rzv. 161, 167.
21. Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 431, 8 N.E.2d 895, 914 (1937),
indicates a typical "hands-off" attitude: "The circumstance that it was in the minds of the
defendant directors that control of the defendant might remain in the hands of the bank anid
its successor does not vitiate their conduct not harmful in other particulars.
"No provision of law required the directors, in making these purchases of stock ... to
buy them ratably from the stockholders." Accord, Murphy v. Hanlon, 322 Mass. 683, 79
N.E.2d 292 (1948).
22. See the excellent dissenting opinion of Timlin, J. in Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140 Wis.
476, 478, 123 N.W. 102, 103 (1909).
Failure to apply effectively the no prejudice requirement has resulted in its displacement
in many jurisdictions by various types of statutory regulations more rigid than the "majority
rule," see appendix, infra. The issue no longer is whether or not stock repurchase is to be
permitted-only New Hampshire and Utah affirmatively prohibit such action. Instead,
the main conflict now concerns the most desirable and effective means of policing the repur-
chase power. But see Nussbaum, Acquisition by a Corporation of its Own Stock, 35 CoL. L,
REv. 971, 978 (1935) (well-documented argument for prohibition of repurchase).
23. Creditors are now accorded a comparable interpretation of the no prejudice rule.
See In re Feckheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (2d Cir. 1914). See, also, Robinson v.
Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1935) (creditors protected from subsequently arising
prejudice when notes taken for repurchased stock fell due 10 years later).
24. E.g., Porter v. Plymouth Gold Mining Co., 29 Mont. 347, 74 Pac. 938 (1904) (diffi-
culty in selling stock in speculative enterprise surmounted by offering it on a six-month op-
tion to return; repurchase contract valid. But cf. Americanized Finance Corp. v. Yarbrough,




unauthorized action of corporate agents,2 5 have been almost uniformly
successful ;26 the no prejudice rule, virtually non-existent in the insider
cases, is completely ignored when the court is confronted with the meri-
torious claim of an unwary buyer.-
In paying their respects to the superior equitable position of outside
buyers, however, the courts ignore the equally worthy claims of stockholders
who were iithout knowledge of the transaction. When the stockholders
have assented to sale of stock tied to a repurchase contract,2 the no preju-
dice rule manifestly should be held inapplicable. But where, as frequently
happens, the contract is a result of unauthorized action by stock salesmen,
stockholders without notice seem as worthy of protection as the unwary
buyer. While in these circumstances losses to original stockholders might be
rationalized as a risk incident to pursuit of profit, the practical impossibility
of restraining commission-compensated corporate agents from making un-
authorized repurchase representations makes this risk a heavy burden.
Aware of the competing equitable interests which sales inducement con-
tracts create and the difficulty of reaching a judicial solution fair to all
parties,2 several states prohibit use of repurchase contracts for sales pur-
poses.30 But a blanket prohibition of this kind also prevents use of repur-
25. See Stratbucker v. Bankers Realty Investment Co., 107 Neb. 194, 135 N.V. 271
(1921) ; Grace Securities Corp. v. Roberts, 158 Va. 792, 164 S.E. 700 (1932). See, also,
Wisconsin Lumber Co. v. Greene and Western Tel. Co., 127 Iowa 350, 101 N.W. 742 (1904).
26. E.g., Davies v. Montana Auto Finance Corp., 86 Mont. 500, 284 Pac. 267 (1930)
(court speaks in usual terms of retention of contract benefits by corporation, constructive
ratification by corporation, corporation's being estopped to deny authority to so contract) ;
Kennerly v. Columbia Chemical Corp., 137 Va. 240, 119 S.E. 265 (1923) (protection given
to a gullible purchaser who had been persuaded to take $15,000 worth of stock in return for
his farm with the understanding that the corporation would repurchase $10,000 worth of the
stock at buyer's option, if exercised within one year).
27. Generally in such cases prejudice to other stockholders is not even mentioned. E.g.,
Kennerly v. Columbia Chemical Corp., supra note 26. See also note 6 supra.
Actually, it is at times difficult to tell from the decisions to just what extent the holder
of a sales inducement repurchase contract was an unwary buyer. The courts then rest en-
forcement of the agreement on the broader ground of benefit to the corporation. See Davies
v. Montana Auto Finance Corp., supra note 26.
28. Acquiesence by the stockholders may actually be explicit, or it may be implied from
a provision in the corporate charter authorizing this type of repurchase.
29- See Epes, J., dissenting in Grace Securities Corp. v. Roberts, 158 Va. 792, 806, 164
S.E. 700, 705 (1932).
30. See Classification VI, appendix, infra. In the jurisdictions set out in Classification
VI, where repurchase is permitted only for specific purposes, provisions for sales inducement
repurchases are conspicuously absent. Two states prohibit stock repurchases entirely. See
Classification II, appendix, infra. It should be noted however, that these statutes apparently
permit buyer's option redemptive right preferred stock, the issue of which may equally
prejudice other stockholders.
Ballantine indicates that preferred stock which must be redeemed at the holder's option
does not in reality constitute a true contribution of capital; rather that it is in essence a con-
tingent liability. BALL¢NTINE, CoaporAcxo-s § 218 (rev. ed. 1946).
For discussion of salient problems in reference to redemptive right stock, see Dodd,
1950] 1181
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
chase agreements even when formally authorized by the corporation, and
thus eliminates what may at times be a desirable and necessary means of
corporate finance.
A preferable statute would permit repurchase agreements but would
condition their validity upon formal incorporation of the contract in the
stock certificate. It would also require shares not subject to repurchase
to be identified as such on the certificate. A statute of this kind would
preclude only unauthorized contracts, and thus would single out and effec-
tively eliminate the real source of prejudice to other stockholders in sales
inducement transactions. 1 Conversely, the statute would put all prospec-
tive buyers on notice that only formal corporate commitments would be
enforceable.
APPENDIX
The "majority rule" and the various other rules concerning stock repur-
chase are set out below in tabular form to show the prevalence and dis-
tribution of each rule. Minor variations are not indicated in the chart.
No. of
Ride States
I. The "majority rule": re- 13
purchase permitted in the ab-
sence of statutory or self-
imposed restrictions if in good
faith and without prejudice
to creditors or other stock-
holders.
II. The "minority rule": re-
purchase prohibited.
Jurisdiction
Americanized Finance Corp. v. Yarbrough,
223 Ala. 266, 135 So. 448 (1931); Copper
Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, 11 Ariz. 334,o 3)
Pac. 94 (1908); Fitzpatrick v. McGregor, 133
Ga. 332, 65 S.E. 859 (1909); Tierney v. But-
ler, 144 Iowa 553, 123 N.W, 213 (1909);
Bates Street Shirt Co. v. Waite, 130 Me. 352,
156 Atl. 293 (1931): Winchell v. Plywood
Corp., 85 N.E.2d 313 (Mass. 1949); Davies
v. Montana Auto Finance Corp., 86 Mont,
500, 284 Pac. 267 (1929); Hoops v. Leddy,
119 N.J. Eq. 296, 182 At. 271 (Ch. 1936);
Byrd v. Tidewater Power Co., 205 N.C.
589, 172 S.E. 183 (1934); West Texas Utili-
ties Co. v. Ellis, 133 Tex. 104, 126 S.W.2d 13
(1939); Marshall v. Fredricksburg Lumber
Co., 162 Va. 136, 173 S.E. 553 (1934); Farm-
ers' Bank v. Champlain Transp. Co., 3 Washb.
131 (Vt. 1846); Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140
Wis. 476, 123 N.W. 102 (1909).
Latullipe v. New England Inv. Co., 77 N.H.
31, 86 At. 361 (1913); Pace v. Pace Bros.
Co., 91 Utah 132,59 P.2d 1 (1936).
Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of its Ozwt Shares: The Substantivc Law, 89
U. OF PA. L. Rsv. 697, 719 (1941) (excellent extensive history of general repurchase
power).
31. A further protection might be afforded the other stockholders by providing that the
directors be prohibited from authorizing sales inducement repurchase agreements unless
given such power by the corporate charter. Such provision would at least afford all stock-
holders an opportunity to determine if the corporation could engage in this type of financing.
Under the existing no prejudice rule, non-prejudicial repurchase is permitted in the absence
of specific statutory or self-imposed restriction. See Classification I, appendix, infra.
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